Mr. President, since I reported to the Security Council on 27th of January,
UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in
New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of
inspections so far to 11 weeks.
Since then, we have also listened on the 5th of February to the presentation
to the Council by the U.S. secretary of state and the discussion that followed.
Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad
with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on the 8th and 9th of
Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed
by UNMOVIC in Iraq.
We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in
Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for
a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft
continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight
helicopters are fully operational.
With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation
of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved.
We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters.
The number of Iraqi minders during inspections has often reached a ratio
-- had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks
in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about
1:1. The situation has improved.
Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering
more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and
access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing
evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.
The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq, at industrial sites,
ammunition depots, research centers, universities, presidential sites, mobile
laboratories, private houses, missile-production facilities, military camps
and agricultural sites.
At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, rebase lining activities
were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents
of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of
previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples,
and discussions with the site's personnel regarding past and present activities.
At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground
structures or buried equipment.
Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge
of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile
capability. But as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections
are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to
the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.
More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected
at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened, using our
own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad center. The results
to date have been consistent with Iraqi declarations.
We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 liters
of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at
the Muthanna site; one-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The
laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found
at another site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This
includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 50 IAEA inspectors, 15 air crew and
65 support staff.
Mr. President, in my 27th of January update to the Council, I said that
it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide
cooperation on process -- most importantly, prompt access to all sites and
assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure.
This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been
without problems, including those that have never been declared or inspected,
as well as to presidential sites and private residences.
In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance
was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament
task to completion and to set the monitoring system on the firm course.
Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors.
In the words of Resolution 1441, it requires immediate, unconditional and
active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament, either
by presenting remaining proscribed items and programs for elimination or
by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated.
In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply.
While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the government of South
Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of
the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons program by a wholehearted
cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that
Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for
How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related
proscribed items and programs? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons,
only a small number of empty chemical munitions which should have been declared
Another matter, and one of great significance, is that many proscribed
weapons and items are not accounted for.
To take an example, a document which Iraq provided suggested to us that
some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for. I must not jump to
the conclusion that they exist; however, that possibility is also not excluded.
If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not
exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.
We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are
convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programs continue
to exist. The U.S. secretary of state presented material in support of this
Governments have many sources of information that are not available to
inspectors. The inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only
on the evidence which they can themselves examine and present publicly.
Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.
Mr. President, in my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding
issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early
1999 and should be well known to Iraq.
I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX,
and long-range missiles, and said that such issues -- and I quote myself
-- "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside,"
The declaration submitted by Iraq on the 7th of December last year, despite
its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and
evidence needed to respond to the open questions.
This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can
understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the
evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself
must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.
In my January update to the Council I referred to the al-Samud II and the
Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile
engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared
to UNMOVIC by Iraq.
I noted that the al-Samud II and the Al Fatah could very well represent
prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to
ranges exceeding the 150 kilometers limit set by the Security Council.
I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these
missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review.
Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts
from a number of member states to discuss these items. The experts concluded
unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants
of the al-Samud II missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometers in range.
This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to Resolution
687 and the monitoring plan adopted by Resolution 715.
As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile
data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile
system could be fully assessed.
With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered
and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been intended
for use in the production of the proscribed Badr 2000 missile system. Iraq
has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have
confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to
produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than
150 kilometers. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.
The expert also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that
is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile
engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far the test
stand has not been associated with the proscribed activity.
On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export-import
mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of Resolution 687, UNMOVIC
inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these
engines were intended for use in the al-Samud II missile system, which has
now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use
in this missile system would also be proscribed. I intend to communicate
these findings to the government of Iraq.
At the meeting in Baghdad on the 8th and the 9th, February, the Iraqi side
addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave
us a number of papers -- for instance, regarding anthrax and growth material,
the nerve agent VX and missile production.
Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening
of 8th of February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February
for further clarifications.
Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues
were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of
the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on the
important open issues.
The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of
anthrax and two VX precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed,
might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although
our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful
that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured
into the grounds years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that
dealt with the items still appears to be needed.
Not least against this background, a letter of the 12th of February from
Iraq's National and Monitoring Directorate may be irrelevant. It presents
a list of 83 names of participants, I quote, "in the unilateral destruction
in the chemical field which took place in the summer of 1991," unquote.
As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains
an important reason why quantities of chemicals had been deemed unaccounted
for, the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about
the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance.
The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have
been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation
of imminent inspection.
Our reservation on this point does not detract from the appreciation of
Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to start
the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under arrangements similar
to those UNSCOM had followed.
We are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of the
French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied
by the German government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft with
night-vision abilities is a welcome one and is next on our agenda for further
improving UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities.
These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently
circulated by France suggesting a further strengthening of the inspection
It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements,
notably trucks, in the face of persistent intelligence reports, for instance
about mobile biological weapons productions units. Such measures could well
increase the effectiveness of inspections.
UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers of
staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting,
I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts who had just completed our general
training course for inspectors. They came from 22 countries, including Arab
Mr. President, UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it
needs to complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task one
has in mind: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items
and programs, which were prohibited in 1991, the disarmament task; or the
monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur.
The latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant and
not controversial. It will require monitoring which is ongoing, that is
open-ended, until the Council decides otherwise.
By contrast, the task of disarmament foreseen in Resolution 687 and the
progress on key remaining disarmament tasks foreseen in Resolution 1284, as
well as the disarmament obligations which Iraq was given a final opportunity
to comply with under Resolution 1441, were always required to be fulfilled
in a shorter time span.
Regrettably, the high degree of cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament
through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination
under UNSCOM and the IAEA supervision of large amounts of weapons, weapons-related
items and installations over the years, the task remained incomplete when
inspectors were withdrawn almost eight years later, at the end of 1998.
If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament
under Resolution 687 could have been short and a decade of sanctions could
have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of Resolution
1441, the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short
if, I quote, "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation," unquote,
with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Following is a transcript of International
Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei's February 14 presentation
to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the inspection effort in
Mr. President, my report to the Council today is an update on the status
of IAEA's nuclear verification activities is Iraq pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions.
Less than three weeks have passed since my last update to the Council on
27 January, a relatively short period in the overall inspection process.
However, I believe it is important for the Council to remain actively engaged
and fully informed at this critical time.
The focus of the IAEA inspection has now moved from the reconnaissance
phase into the investigative phase.
The reconnaissance phase was aimed at reestablishing rapidly our knowledge
base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at
known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear
material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying
the current workplace of former key Iraqi personnel.
The focus of the investigative phase is achieving and understanding of
Iraq's activities over the last four years, in particular in areas identified
by states as being of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis
of its own analysis.
Since our 27 January report, the IAEA has conducted an additional 38 inspections
at 19 locations, for a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq has
continued to provide immediate access to all locations.
In the course of the inspections, we have identified certain facilities
at which we will be establishing containment and surveillance systems in order
to monitor on a continuous basis activities associated with critical dual-use
At this time, we are using recurrent inspections to ensure that this equipment
is not being used for prohibitive purposes.
As I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have a number of wide
areas and location-specific measures for detecting indications of undeclared
past or ongoing nuclear activities in Iraq, including environmental sampling
and radiation detection surveys. In this regard, we have been collecting
a broad variety of samples, including water, sediment and vegetation, at
inspected facilities and at other locations across Iraq and analyzing them
for signature of nuclear activities.
We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq. Three of the
four air samplers that were removed in December 2002 for refurbishing have
been returned to Iraq. One of these has been installed at a fixed location
and the other two are being operated from mobile platforms. We are intending
to increase their number to make optimum use of this technique.
We are also continuing to expand the use of hand-held and car-borne gamma
surveys in Iraq. The gamma survey vehicle has been used en route to inspection
sites and within sites, as well as in urban and industrial areas. We will
start helicopter-borne gamma surveys as soon as relevant equipment receives
its final certification for use on the helicopter model provided to us for
use in Iraq.
The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have recently
been able to conduct four interviews in private; that is, without the presence
of an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, however, have tape recorded their
In addition, discussions have continued to be conducted with Iraqi technicians
and officials as part of inspection activities and technical meetings.
I should note that during our recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed
its commitment to encourage its citizens to accept interviews in private,
both inside and outside of Iraq.
In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the list of relevant
Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work locations. The
list includes the higher-level scientists known to the IAEA in the nuclear
and nuclear-related areas. We will continue, however, to ask for information
about Iraqi personnel of lesser rank whose work may be of significance to
I would like now to provide an update on a number of specific issues that
we are currently pursuing. I should mention that shortly before our recent
meeting in Baghdad, and based on our discussion with Iraqi counterpart,
Iraq provided documentation related to these issues: the reported attempt
to import uranium, the attempted procurement of aluminum tubes, the procurement
of magnets and magnet- production capabilities, the use of HMX, and those
questions and concerns that were outstanding in 1998.
I will touch briefly on each of these issues.
Iraq continues to state that it has made no attempt to import uranium since
the 1980s. The IAEA recently received some additional information relevant
to this issue, which will be further pursued, hopefully with the assistance
of the African country reported to have been involved.
The IAEA is also continuing to follow up on acknowledged effort by Iraq
to important high-strength aluminum tubes. As you all know, Iraq has declared
these efforts to have been in connection with a program to reverse engineer
conventional rockets. The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed been manufacturing
such rockets. However, we are still exploring whether the tubes were intended
rather for the manufacture of centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
In connection with this investigation, Iraq has been asked to explain the
reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that it had requested from
various suppliers. Iraq has provided documentation related to the project
of reverse engineering and has committed itself to providing samples of
tubes received from prospective suppliers. We will continue to investigate
the matter further.
In response to the IAEA inquiries about Iraq's attempt to procure a facility
for the manufacture of magnets and the possible link with the resumption
of a nuclear program, Iraq recently provided additional documentation's,
which we are presently examining.
In the course of an inspection conducted in connection with aluminum tube
investigation, the IAEA inspectors found a number of documents relevant
to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fiber, a dual-use material
used by Iraq in the past clandestine uranium enrichment program for the
manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors.
Our review of these documents suggests that the carbon fibers sought by
Iraq was not intended for enrichment purpose, as the specification of the
material appear not to be consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor
In addition, we have carried out follow-up inspection, during which we
have been able to observe the use of such carbon fibers in non-nuclear-related
applications and to take samples. The IAEA will nevertheless continue to
pursue this matter.
We have also continued to investigate the relocation and consumption of
the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared that 32 tons
of the HMX previously under IAEA seals had been transferred for use in the
production of industrial explosives, primarily to cement plants as a booster
for explosives used in quarrying.
Iraq has provided us with additional information, including documentation
on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have been conducted
at locations where the material is said to have been used. However, given
the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that the IAEA will
be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of this material.
While we have no indication that this material was used for any application
other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of verifying
quantitatively the declared use of the material in explosions.
We will continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian mining
practices in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved
in former relevant research and development activities.
We have completed a more detailed review of the 2,000 pages of documents
found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi scientist. The
documents relate predominately to lasers, including the use of laser technology
to enrich uranium. They consist of technical reports, minutes of meetings,
including those of the Standard Committee for Laser Application, personal
notes, copies of publications and student research projects, thesis, and
a number of administered documents, some of which were marked as classified.
While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq's
laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites
already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist
in whose home they were found.
Nothing contained in the document alters the conclusion previously drawn
by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment program. We
nevertheless continue to emphasize to Iraq that it should search for and
provide all documents, personal or otherwise, that might be relevant to our
Last week, Iraq has also provided the IAEA with documentation related to
questions and concerns that since 1990 have been a need for further gratification,
particularly as regards weapons and centrifuge designs. However, no new
information was contained in this documentation.
It is to be hoped that the new Iraqi commissions established by Iraq to
look for any additional documents on hardware relevant to its programs for
weapons of mass destruction will be able to uncover documents and other evidence
that could assist in clarifying these remaining questions and concerns,
as well as other areas of current concern.
Finally, as Dr. Blix just mentioned, I was informed this morning by the
director general of Iraq's national monitoring directorate that national legislation
prohibiting proscribed activities was adopted today. The resolution of this
longstanding legal matter was, in my view, a step in the right direction
for Iraq to demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under
Security Council resolutions.
In the coming weeks, the IAEA will continue to expand its inspection capabilities
in a number of ways, including its already extensive use of unannounced
inspections at all relevant sites in Iraq to strengthen and accelerate our
ability to investigate matters of concern and to reinstate and reinforce
our ongoing monitoring and verification system that came to a halt in 1998.
We intend to increase the number of inspectors and support staff. We will
also be adding more analysts and translators to support analysis of documents
and other inspection findings. We intend to augment the number of customs
and procurement experts for the monitoring of imports by Iraq. We will also
intensify and expand the range of technical meetings and private interviews
with Iraqi personnel in accordance with our preferred modalities and locations,
both inside and outside Iraq.
In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for near, real- time
monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities and implement several
additional components of wide-area environmental monitoring aimed at identifying
fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. We
hope to continue to receive from states actionable information relevant
to our mandate.
Now that Iraq has accepted the use of all of the platform for aerial surveillance
proposed by supporting states to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, including the U-2s,
Mirage IV, Antonov and drones, we plan to make use of them to support our
inspection activities. In particular, was a view to monitoring movements
in and around sites to be inspected.
The government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to comply with
its Security Council obligations and to provide full and active cooperation
with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making good on this commitment,
the above measures will contribute to the effectiveness of the inspection
Mr. President, as I have reported on numerous occasions, the IAEA concluded
by December 1998 that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear program and
that, therefore, there was no unresolved disarmament issues left at that
Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspection in Iraq two and
a half months ago has been verifying whether Iraq revived its nuclear program
in the intervening years.
We have, to date, found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related
activities in Iraq.
However, as I have just indicated, a number of issues are still under investigation,
and we are not yet in a position to reach a conclusion about them, although
we are moving forward with regard to some of them.
To that end, we intend to make full use of the authority granted to us
under all relevant Security Council resolutions to build as much capacity
into the inspection process as necessary. In that context, I would underline
the importance of information that State may be able to provide to help us
in assessing the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by
The IAEA experience in the nuclear verification shows that it is possible,
particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess the presence
or absence of a nuclear weapon program in a state, even without the full
cooperation of the inspected states.
However, prompt, full and active cooperation by Iraq, as required under
Resolution 1441, will speed up the process, and more importantly, it will
enable us to reach the high degree of assurance required by the Security Council
in the case of Iraq in view of its past clandestine WMD programs and past
pattern of cooperation.
It is my hope that the commitment made recently in Baghdad will continue
to translate into concrete and sustained actions.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Following is a transcript of U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell's response to weapons inspectors' February 14 presentation
to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the inspection effort in
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished members of the council,
it's a great pleasure to be here with you again to consider this very important
matter, and I'm very pleased to be here as the secretary of state of a relatively
new country on the face of the Earth.
But I think I can take some credit sitting here as being the representative
of the oldest democracy that is assembled here around this table. Proud
of that. A democracy that believes in peace, a nation that has tried in
the course of its history to show how people can live in peace with one another,
but a democracy that has not been afraid to meet its responsibilities on
the world stage when it has been challenged; more importantly, when others
in the world have been challenged, or when the international order has been
challenged, or when the international institutions of which we are a part
have been challenged.
That's why we have joined and been active members of institutions such
as the United Nations and a number of other institutions that have come
together for the purpose of peace and for the purpose of mutual security
and for the purpose of letting other nations which pursue a path of destruction,
which pursue paths of developing weapons of mass destruction which threaten
their neighbors, to let them know that we will stand tall, we will stand
together to meet these kinds of challenges.
I want to express my appreciation to Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their
presentation this morning. They took up a difficult challenge when they
went back into Iraq last fall in pursuit of disarmament as required by Resolution
1441. And I listened very attentively to all they said this morning, and
I am pleased that there have been improvements with respect to process. I'm
pleased that there have been improvements with respect to not having five
minders with each inspector, down to something less than five minders with
But I think they still are being minded, they are still being watched,
they are still being bugged, they still do not have the freedom of access
around Iraq that they need to do their job well.
I'm pleased that a few people have come forward for interviews, but not
all the people who should be coming forward for interviews, and with the freedom
to interview them in a manner that their safety can be protected and the
safety of their families can be protected as required by U.N. Resolution
I am glad that access has been relatively good. But that is all process,
it is not substance.
I am pleased to hear that decrees have now been issued that should have
been issued years and years ago, but does anybody really think a decree from
Saddam Hussein -- directed to whom -- is going to fundamentally change the
situation? And it comes out on a morning when we are moving forward down the
path laid out by Resolution 1441. These are all process issues. These are
all tricks that are being played on us.
And to say that new commissions are being formed that will go find materials
that they claim are not there in the first place -- can anybody honestly
believe that either one of these two new commissions will actively seek out
information that they have been actively trying to deny to the world community,
to the inspectors, for the last 11-plus years?
I commend the inspectors. I thank them for what they are doing. But at
the same time, I have to keep coming back to the point that the inspectors
have repeatedly made, and they've made it again here this morning, they've
been making it for the last 11-plus years: What we need is not more inspections,
what we need is not more immediate access, what we need is immediate, active,
unconditional, full cooperation on the part of Iraq. What we need is for
Iraq to disarm.
Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. Let me say that again. Resolution
1441 was not about inspections. Resolution 1441 was about the disarmament
We worked on that resolution for seven weeks, from the time of President
Bush's powerful speech here at the United Nations General Assembly on the
12th of September until the resolution was passed on the 8th of November.
We had intense discussions. All of you are familiar with it. You participated
in these discussions. And it was about disarmament. And the resolution began
with the clear statement that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations
for the past 11 years and remains to that day, the day the resolution was
passed, in material breach. And the resolution said Iraq must now come into
compliance, it must disarm.
The resolution went on to say that we want to see a declaration from Iraq
within 30 days of all of its activities, put it all on the table. "Let's
see what you have been doing. Give us a declaration that we can believe and
that is full, complete and accurate." That's what we said to Iraq on the
8th of November. And some 29 days later, we got 12,000 pages. Nobody in this
Council can say that that was a full, complete or accurate declaration.
And now it is several months after that declaration was submitted. And
I have heard nothing to suggest that they have filled in the gaps that were
in that declaration or they have added new evidence that should give us
any comfort that we have a full, complete and accurate declaration.
You will recall we put that declaration requirement into the resolution
as an early test of Iraq's seriousness. Are they serious? Are they going to
disarm? Are they going to comply? Are they going to cooperate?
And the answer with that declaration was no, we're going to see what we
can get away with. We can see how much we can slip under your nose and everybody
will clap and say, isn't that wonderful? They provided a declaration. That
was of not any particular use.
We then had some level of acceptance of the fact that inspectors were going
back in. We called that. Iraq tried to use this gambit right after the president's
speech in September to try to keep Resolution 1441 from ever coming down
the pipe. Suddenly, in the following Monday after the president's speech:
"Oh, we'll let inspectors back in."
Why? Because when the president spoke and when Iraq saw that the international
community was now coming together with seriousness and with determination,
it knew it better do something. It didn't do it out of the goodness of its
heart or it suddenly discovered that it's been in violation for all of those
years. They did it because of the pressure. They did it because this Council
stood firm. They did it because the international community said, "Enough,
we will not tolerate Iraq continuing to have weapons of mass destruction
to be used against its own people, to be used against its neighbors, or worse,
if we find a post-9/11 nexus between Iraq and terrorist organizations that
are looking for just such weapons."
And I would submit, and will provide more evidence, that such connections
are now emerging, and we can establish that they exist.
We cannot wait for one of these terrible weapons to show up in one of our
cities and wonder where it came from after it's been detonated by al Qaeda
or somebody else. This is the time to go after this source of this kind
And that's what 1441 was all about.
And to this day, we have not seen the level of cooperation that was expected,
anticipated, hoped for. I hoped for it. No one worked harder than the United
States. And I submit to you, no one worked harder, if I may humbly say,
I did, to try to put forward a resolution that would show the determination
of the international community to the leadership in Iraq so that they would
now meet their obligations and come clean and comply. And they did not.
Notwithstanding all of the discussion we have heard so far this morning
about give inspections more time, let's have more airplanes flying over, let's
have more inspectors added to the inspection process -- Dr. Blix noted earlier
this week that it's not more inspectors that it needed. What's needed is
what both Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have said what's been needed since 1991:
immediate, active, unconditional compliance and cooperation.
I'm pleased that Iraq is now discussing this matter with South Africa.
But it isn't brain surgery. South Africa knows how to do it. Anybody knows
how to do it. If we were getting the kind of cooperation that we expected
when 1441 was passed and we hoped when 1441 was passed, these documents
would be flooding out of homes, flooding out of factories. There would be
no question about access. There would be no question about interviews.
If Iraq was serious in this matter, interviewees would be standing outside
of UNMOVIC and IAEA offices in Baghdad and elsewhere waiting to be interviewed,
because they are determined to prove to the world, to give the world all
the evidence needed that these weapons of mass destruction are gone.
But the questions, notwithstanding all of the level of letter, the questions
remain, and some of my colleagues have talked about them. We haven't accounted
for the anthrax, we haven't accounted for the botulinum, VX, both biological
agents, growth media, 30,000 chemical and biological munitions.
These are not trivial matters one can just ignore and walk away from and
say, "Well, maybe the inspectors will find them, maybe they won't."
We have not had a complete, accurate declaration.
We have seen the reconstitution of casting chambers for missiles. Why?
Because they are still trying to develop these weapons. We have seen the
kind of cooperation that was anticipated, expected and demanded of this body.
And we must continue to demand it. We must continue to put pressure on
Iraq, put force upon Iraq to make sure that the threat of force is not removed,
because 1441 was all about compliance, not inspections. The inspections
were put in as a way, of course, to assist Iraq in coming forward and complying,
in order to verify, in order to monitor, as the chief inspector noted.
But we so got an incomplete answer from Iraq, we are facing a difficult
situation. More inspectors? Sorry, not the answer. What we need is immediate
cooperation. Time? How much time does it take to say, "I understand the will
of the international community, and I and my regime are laying it all out
for you and not playing guess -- not forming commissions, not issuing decrees,
not getting laws that should've been passed years ago suddenly passed on the
day when we are meeting"?
These are not responsible actions on the part of Iraq. These are contingent
efforts to deceive, to deny, to divert, to throw us off the trail, to throw
us off the path.
The resolution anticipated this kind of response from Iraq. And that's
why in all our discussions about that resolution we said they're in material
breach. If they come into new material breach with a false declaration or
not a willingness to cooperate and comply, as OP4 says, then the matter has
to be referred to the Council for serious consequences.
I submit to you that, notwithstanding the improvements in process that
we have noted and I welcome -- and I thank the inspectors for their hard
work -- these improvements in process do not move us away from the central
problem that we continue to have. And more inspections and a longer inspection
period will not move us away from the central issue, the central problem
we are facing. And that central problem is that Iraq has failed to comply
The threat of force must remain. Force should always be a last resort.
I have preached this for most of my professional life as a soldier and as
a diplomat. But it must be a resort.
We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out, as Iraq is trying
to do right now: "String it out long enough, and the world will start looking
in other directions, the Security Council will move on, we'll get away with
it again." My friends, they cannot be allowed to get away with it again.
We now are in a situation where Iraq's continued noncompliance and failure
to cooperate, it seems to me, in the clearest terms requires this Council
to begin to think through the consequences of walking away from this problem,
or the reality that we have to face this problem, and that, in the very
near future, we will have to consider whether or not we've reached this
Council, as distasteful as it may be, as reluctant as we may be, as many
as -- there are so many of you who would rather not to face this issue,
but it's an issue that must be faced, and that is whether or not it is time
to consider serious consequences of the kind intended by 1441.
The reason we must not look away from it is because these are terrible
weapons. We are talking about weapons that will kill not a few people, not
a hundred people, not a thousand people, but could kill tens of thousands
of people, if these weapons got into the wrong hands.
And the security of the region, the hopes for the people of Iraq themselves,
and our security rests upon us meeting our responsibilities and, if it comes
to it, invoking the serious consequences called for in 1441.
1441 is about disarmament and compliance, and not merely a process of inspections
that goes on forever without ever resolving the basic problem.
Following is a transcript of Iraqi ambassador
Mohammed Aldouri's response to weapons inspectors' February 14 presentation
to the U.N. Security Council on the progress of the inspection effort in
ALDOURI: In the name of God, the compassionate (inaudible) Mr. President,
I thank you. And I thank this august council for this opportunity granted
Iraq to participate in this session and to address this Security Council
within the time allotted us.
I have listened very carefully to the presentation by Dr. Blix, the chairman
of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
and Dr. ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, as well as the esteemed
members of the Security Council, and I should like to point out the following.
Iraq accepted to deal with Resolution 1441 based on the fact that this
is the means to reach a solution to the so-called issue of the disarmament
of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Following three rounds of technical
negotiations with the United Nations, following the return of inspectors
to Iraq, Iraq indeed provided all that may fall within the concept of a
proactive Iraqi cooperation.
And I should like to point to the following. Iraq submitted the declaration
required under paragraph 3 of Resolution 1441 in record time. The declaration
contained many documents on previous Iraqi programs in the nuclear, chemical,
biological and ballistic fields.
We continue to believe that these documents require in-depth study by the
relevant authorities, because they contain updated information responding
to many questions. We have the right to wonder has the declaration been
subjected to study with due-diligence and depth or should the declaration
be reconsidered as a whole by the relevant authorities? We should like the
file to be reconsidered in total.
Second, Iraq's doors were open to the inspection teams without restrictions
or conditions. And the world -- the entire world -- was surprised at this
level of unprecedented cooperation. We know that some states were not very
happy with this cooperation; in fact, some would have wished Iraq had obstructed
inspections or locked some doors. However, this did not and will not happen
because Iraq has genuinely decided to prove that it is free of weapons of
mass destruction and to lift any doubt in that regard.
And let me mention what Drs. Blix and ElBaradei stated this morning: 675
inspections have taken place so far within Iraq. In this short of period
of time, the inspectors have found no evidence contradicting Iraq's declarations
or bolstering the allegations asserted by the United States and the United
Kingdom on the proscribed weapons programs or, indeed, the weapons alleged
by the distinguished representative of the U.K. this morning.
Now, concerning interviews with Iraqi scientists, the government of Iraq
continues to encourage those scientists to accept interviews. Additional
lists of names containing other scientists have been submitted following
the requests by Drs. Blix and ElBaradei. Other lists are on their way, as
Four, Iraq did agree to over-flights by U-2 aircraft, by Mirage aircraft
and by Antonov 2 aircraft in Iraqi airspace for surveillance purposes. It
is logical and reasonable that while these aircraft are undergoing their
missions, it is reasonable and logical for British and U.S. warplanes to
cease air strikes, because this will affect the security. Thus, inspectors
have six levels of aerial surveillance, beginning with satellites, followed
by high-altitude surveillance aircraft, the U-2, then medium-level aircraft,
the Mirage aircraft, then low-level aircraft, Antonov 2, followed by helicopters
and other means for aerial surveillance.
As for the issue of the Iraqi penal legislation that some have considered
among the important elements of Iraqi's cooperation, Iraq had not had a
negative position in this regard. We had technical considerations.
At any rate, the decree was enacted today in order to end the controversy
surrounding this matter. I was surprised to hear some say that this decree
was unimportant or late in coming.
Concerning other issues, UNMOVIC, following its establishment, adopted
a process that includes merging outstanding disarmament issues within the
reinforced monitoring system, and this was referenced in its report to the
Security Council S-2292. However, in order to facilitate UNMOVIC's mission
in identifying these issues and resolving them, Iraq in its full, comprehensive
and updated declaration of the 7th of December 2002, provided full details
on these outstanding issues and the means to resolve them. Nevertheless,
Iraq has begun to proactively cooperate with UNMOVIC, having lately agreed
to discuss these issues with Iraq. And we have provided 24 documents pertaining
to many of the outstanding issues.
Two commissions have been set up, made up of high Iraqi officials and scientists
to consider these issues and to provide all the information thereon. And
this has been requested by Drs. Blix and ElBaradei on more than one occasion.
After all that, we continue to face allegations by some that Iraq not only
has not cooperated, but rather that Iraq is in material breach of 1441.
Our question is, where is this material breach? Is it as asserted in the
allegations made by the United States of America at the previous session,
which did not gain acceptance by many states in the world or is the matter
related to the concept of proactive cooperation required of Iraq? Many in
this forum have called for proactive cooperation.
What is this proactive cooperation? If it means that Iraq is to show weapons
of mass destruction, we would respond saying: Mr. President, by an Arab
proverb I hope will be interpreted correctly, an empty hand has nothing
to give. You cannot give what you don't have. If we do not possess such weapons,
how can we disarm ourselves of such weapons? Indeed, how can they be disarmed
when they do not exist?
At any rate, we join the cause of those who do believe that the best means
to resolve these issues is continuing proactive cooperation with the inspectors.
We do not stand with those who want failure for the inspection work.
And I would refer to the quote in The Washington Post from members of the
U.S. Senate, and I quote, "We, the U.S. government, have undermined the
As for the missile issue, I should like to point out, distinguished ministers
and ambassadors, that Iraq -- and I say that to the uninformed -- Iraq declared
these missiles in its biannual declaration and in its full declaration to
the Security Council. They were not uncovered by the inspectors. Iraq continues
to stress that these missiles, delivered to our armed forces, do not have
a range of over 150 kilometers. The issue was lately discussed with the
Iraq believes that this issue can be taken up toward a technical solution,
and therefore it is not logical to accuse Iraq that it is going beyond the
permitted range so long as Iraq is dealing with these issues in full transparency,
so long as its establishments and test areas are open and under oversight.
Iraq would suggest in this regard that test-firings can be undertaken through
a random choice of missiles in order to ascertain the range. However, the
option of dialogue is open between technical parties in Iraq and within
UNMOVIC in order to reach a satisfactory solution to this issue.
Mr. President, when it comes to VX and anthrax, which were also mentioned,
Iraq has put forward practical proposals to resolve these issues among other
outstanding issues. These are related to VX, to anthrax, as well as some
chemical precursors, as well as information on growth media. Iraq suggested
that one could ascertain the amount of VX and anthrax destroyed through measuring
the dissolved quantities of VX and anthrax in the unilateral destruction
sites. And that there is a means to extrapolate the quantity destroyed through
scientific investigation and comparing that with Iraq's declaration. And
therefore, the issue needs perseverance because it is a difficult subject.
Mr. President, in conclusion, at a time when voices in the world are rising,
calling on the United States and Great Britain to heed reason and to respect
international legitimacy, the United States of America and the United Kingdom
continue to mass forces against Iraq in an unjust cruel campaign, believing
that this vast media campaign will make the world silent.
We would like to stress that Iraq has chosen the path of peace. We want
to reach solutions that satisfy the international community. We are prepared
to provide all means to assist in clarifying the real picture to avoid the
objectives of those who are ill-intentioned, who wish to ignite a war in
Iraq with incalculable consequences toward clear colonial objectives.
We wish the Security Council to follow the wish of the vast majority of
member-states in the United Nations. It is to give the inspectors their full
role by undertaking their tasks through the path of dialogue and proactive
cooperation leading certainly to peace and not war. We would also seriously
call on the Security Council to consider lifting the unjust embargo imposed
on Iraq and to rise to its commitments by respecting Iraq's sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity. We call upon it to continue to work toward the
elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in implementation
of paragraph 14 of Resolution 687.
I thank you, Mr. President.
I shall appreciate comments and updated information about U.N. UNMOVIC
and Atomic Energy Agency inspections and any international expert witnessing
approach for Peace and Justice.
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